In the realm of international relations (IR) today, every strategic decision and new foreign policy agenda created, like a chess game, is greatly weighed upon the move of one's opponent. For China in particular, viewing the U.S. and many other prominent nation-states as competitors on the international stage, was one of the major reason's for China's embark on its own discourse of public diplomacy (PD).
China's forwardness to engage in PD, is a notably new attempt made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to utilize the soft power approach of engagement with other nation-states around the world, while promoting a positive image of China. In an effort to promote soft power, and the attractiveness of Chinese culture, the CCP established the Confucius Institutes in 2004. These institutes have been very successful in providing foreign publics with an opportunity to gain a better understanding of both Chinese culture and language. However, while popular in certain nation-states, the Confucius Institutes have not assisted CCP in tackling one of China's major hurdles of establishing a strong sense of trust with many Western nation-states, specifically Western European nations. In this aspect, China's soft power approach and methods appears self-limited because the CCP does not effectively utilize soft power (Craig Hayden 2012, p. 172). Soft power, is an agglomeration of many elements of a state and the society (Shanthi Kalathil 2011). The CCP, is a perfect case example of a state government trying to utilize soft power in transforming its foreign relations via communications to a connected global network, and not choosing to explore additional soft power concepts that would recommend placing a stronger emphasis on civil society engagement and public activeness. As stated in an ISD (Institute for The Study of Diplomacy) report, China's Soft Power in the Information Age: Think Again, the CCP can not unilaterally decide to accrue soft power, because soft power is not solely generated by the state, but also by its culture, businesses, and most importantly, its people (Kalathil 2011).
From my analysis on the readings, recent news reports, journal articles, and academic books, soft power effectiveness works best in a nation-state with strong governmental body, and an engaged civil society. Deemed as a collective society by nature, the CCP in my opinion needs to re-assess the roadblocks that it faces from its present soft power approach and incorporate new diverse elements; such readdressing whom its soft power approach will be directed towards specifically. As previously stated earlier, the CCP is working towards establishing a positive image of itself as a strong part of its foreign policy agenda. China, already enjoys, close-ties with developing nation-states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Yiwei Wang 2008, p. 264). These nation-states, view China positively compared to its regional neighbors (ie. India, Korea, and Vietnam) and Western nations (ie. France, Germany, and the UK), whom are worried of China's rapid rise on the international stage. In targeting nation-states, in which China currently does not have close-ties, the CCP's soft power and PD initiatives should be focused on reaching out to European nations, individually.
As a nation-state with an abundant amount of resources politically, economically, and culturally, utilizing all three within its continued PD efforts and soft power framework, would be a most suited supplement to the traditional hard power approach, once commonly practiced. But, overall, the CCP must work to overcome its own constraints (ie. collectivism ideology) in its usage of soft power, and be open to providing support to Chinese businesses, domestic non-governmental organizations, and maybe even its civil society, in being actively engaged in soft power usage. This might greatly assist in reducing outside perceptions of a "China threat", which presently proves to be one of the major obstacles preventing China from being viewed positively. However, realistically thinking, this would be a major step for the CCP to take, especially since their perception of 'openness' and 'public engagement' are quote "Western ideals and values", and not considered the Chinese approach, or style in IR.
Works Cited:
Craig Hayden (2012) “China: Cultivating a Global Soft Power” in
Rhetoric of Soft Power, Chapter 5.
Shanthi Kalathil (2011) “China’s Soft power in the Information Age:
Think Again” ISD Working Papers in New Diplomacy. Pages 1-12.
Yiwei Wang (2008) Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616. Pages 257-273.
I think you touch on a theme that appears throughout this course. Soft power cannot be unilaterally declared. Like "collaborative power" it is as much a product of its audience as it is a function of "assets" (the promotion of culture, for example). You can't just declare soft power, but work with stakeholders to help them identify with it. Because of this, I think soft power may be better understood post hoc - as a condition of legitimacy that can be observed to contribute to some act or status in IR. I think this is ultimately the aim of Chinese PD - to change the context for its other foreign policy actions, a context that reflects that status of China's soft power.
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